The State of Utah v. Juanita Cruz : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
The State of Utah v. Juanita Cruz : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kim Rilling; Rilling and Associates; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Linda Luinstra; Assistant Attorney General; Ann Wassermann;
Littlefield and Peterson; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Cruz, No. 900162 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2556
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
60 
DOCKET NO * *' ^ * W TW THT? UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In The Interest Of: 
CRUZ, Jesse 
(12-08-79) 
vs. 
Juanita Cruz, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
HONORABLE OLAF A. JOHANSSON, PRESIDING 
KIM RILLING 
RILLING & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Appellant 
8 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
LINDA LUINSTRA 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ANN WASSERMANN 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Case No. 394707 
Judge: Olaf A. Johansson 
90-uiw-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In The Interest Of: 
CRUZ, Jesse 
(12-08-79) 
vs. 
Juanita Cruz, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 394707 
Judge: Olaf A. Johansson 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
HONORABLE OLAF A. JOHANSSON, PRESIDING 
KIM RILLING 
RILLING & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Appellant 
8 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
LINDA LUINSTRA 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ANN WASSERMANN 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Authorities ii 
Jurisdiction of Courts 1 
Nature of Proceeding 1 
Statement of Issues .« . . * 1 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions 
and Statutes «. • „
 c « • 1 
Statement of the Case * 2 
Statement of Facts « 2 
Summary of Argument „ 4 
Argument 1 4 
II 7 
III 8 
Conclusion 10 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Page 
Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 5 
In re J.P., 848 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982) 5 
In re T.R. F., 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah App. 1988) 5 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 5 
Quillion v. Walcott 434 U.S 246 (1978).. 5 
Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980)... 7 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) 5 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 5 
Summers v. Wullfenstein 560 P.2d 331 (Utah 1977) 9 
li 
Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Section 
78-3a-51, Utah Code Anno. (1953), as amended (hereinafter 
U.C.A.). 
Nature of Proceeding 
This is an appeal from an order terminating the parental 
rights of the appellant, Juanita Cruz, rendered by the Third 
District Juvenile Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Olaf A. Johansson presiding. 
Statement of Issues 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether or not the lower court improperly relied on 
hearsay evidence in making its decision to terminate the natural 
mother's parental rights; and 
2. Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support 
the lower court's Findings and Order once the improper hearsay 
evidence is excluded. 
Determinative Constitutional 
Provisions and Statutes 
1. The Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
2. Article I, Section 25 of the Utah Constitution. 
3. Section 78-3a-48(b), (d). 
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Statement of the Case and Facts 
Presented on Appeal 
This is an appeal from the final order of the Third District 
Juvenile Court, the Honorable Olaf A. Johansson presiding, 
terminating the parental rights of the appellant, the natural 
mother of the child who is the subject of this appeal. The 
petition requesting termination of the appellant's parental 
rights was filed on the 15th day of November, 1989. Trial on the 
petition was held on the 26th day of January, 1990. The Findings 
and Order Terminating Mother's Parental Rights, of which the 
appellant seeks review, were filed on the 15th day of February, 
1990. The Notice of Appeal was filed on the 6th day of March, 
1990, and the Docketing Statement was filed on the 9th day of 
April,1990. 
At the time of trial representations from all parties 
limited the scope of the trial to the issue of abandonment. The 
natural mother's fitness or competence as a parent was 
specifically excluded as an issue. T at 4. 
In addressing this issue, as its case in chief, the State 
called one witness, Kathy Haderlie. Ms. Haderlie, a social 
worker for the Division of Family Services (hereinafter D.F.S. or 
the agency), testified that she had only been the assigned worker 
for some time over a year. Yet, Ms. Haderlie was permitted to 
testify about the case and the parties' conduct from the time of 
the child J.C.'s placement with the agency in 1984. Her 
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testimony encompassed more time in which she was not the worker 
than where she acted as the social worker. T at 7-9. Throughout 
Ms. Haderlie's testimony defense counsel objected to the 
admission of the hearsay statements. The lower court noted a 
continuing objection to the hearsay testimony. T at 10 and 13. 
Calling this hearsay evidence "foundational", the trial 
court permitted the State to present this evidence pursuant to 
Rule 803(6), Utah Rules of Evidence. T. at 9. But calling the 
evidence foundational hardly made it so. For example, Ms. 
Haderlie was permitted to testify as to canceled visits, the 
timeliness of visits, conduct at visits and even the child's 
reactions to visits. T. at 10 - 13. All of which occurred prior 
to the witness1 involvement. 
More pertinently, the State's witness did testify with 
respect to her immediate involvement in the case. The exact date 
of her initial involvement was not established for the record. 
However, the worker did testify that she'd been involved in the 
case for "nearly" two years. T. at 15. 
With respect to this time period, the worker testified, in 
essence, that she had simply put the mother and her requests and 
questions about the child off. Although there existed no 
restraining order preventing contact between mother and child, a 
requested visit was denied and the natural mother was told to 
call her lawyer. T. at 25. As the witness explained, although 
no permanent deprivation petition had been filed, because the 
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agency was having difficulty finding an adoptive home, she had no 
intention of permitting contact between the child and his mother 
when Juanita made her requests in the spring of 1989. T. at 27. 
Summary of the Argument 
Where rights as significant as those of a parent in her 
child are at issue, the parent is entitled to more procedural 
awareness and consideiration than that afforded by, for example, 
an administrative hearing. To accept hearsay evidence, which is 
otherwise material to the issue of abandonment, under the guise 
of the business records exception is impermissible. The lower 
court erred in its admittance of the testimony regarding 
information contained in D.F.S. files. 
The hearsay evidence presented at trial was integral to the 
State's case. Without this evidence there is a failure to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the natural mother 
abandoned her child. 
Further, the Findings and Order Terminating Mother's 
Parental Rights lack the support of the trial record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Admittance of hearsay Evidence 
in Permanent Deprivation Cases 
is Fundamentally Impermissible. 
As this court is well aware, state and federal courts afford 
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constitutional protection to the relationship between a parent 
and her child. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); In 
re J.P., 848 P.2d 1364, 1372 (Utah 1982); In re T.R.F., 90 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah App. 1988). 
The fundamental interest of parents to care for and rear 
their children is based on social as well as constitutional 
grounds. "The integrity of the family and parents1 inherent 
right and authority to rear their own children have long been 
recognized as fundamental axioms of Anglo-American culture, 
presupposed by all our social, political and legal institutions." 
In re J.P., supra at, 1373. 
This fundamental right also derives from a number of 
provisions of the United States Constitution. "The integrity of 
the family unit has found protection in the Due Process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923), the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); and the Ninth 
Amendment." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965), 
cited in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, (1972). 
Similarly, family rights are protected in Article I, Section 
25 of the Utah Constitution which states, "This enumeration of 
rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained 
by the people." the fundamental right. In re J.P., supra at 1375. 
The natural parents right to be with their child, to raise their 
child, and to function as a family are all constitutionally 
protected. 
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Given the gravity of parental rights, a parent whose rights 
are at stake must be allowed to exercise right of confrontation. 
To deny the parent her right to cross-examine her accusers is to 
make light of her parental rights. As noted above, the record in 
this case is replete with hearsay evidence, and significant 
evidence. Parent-child contact which was described by the 
witness prior to her evolvement in the case goes directly to the 
issue of abandonment. We should no more think of finding 
abandonment based on this evidence than we would of finding an 
individual guilty of homicide based on hearsay identification 
testimony. 
Not only does the admission of hearsay deny one the right of 
confrontation, it also prevents the trial court from making a 
well informed decision. Where rights as significant as those of 
a parent in a child are concerned, the court should only make a 
determination terminating those rights after considering complete 
and, taken as a whole, objective evidence. 
In this case, the hearsay testimony was permitted pursuant 
to Rule 803(6), Utah Rules Of Evidence, the business records 
exception. Had D.F.S. records been admitted, they would have 
been improperly admitted for the reasons stated above. However, 
the hearsay problem is compounded in this instance because the 
agency's records were not admitted. Rather, the court accepted 
the social worker's opinion of what was allegedly represented in 
the records. The witness's testimony regarding agency records 
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was not admissible under Rule 803(6). Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & 
Co,, 622 P.2d 1168, 1173-74 (Utah 1980). 
POINT II 
The Record Does Not Support 
A Finding Of Abandonment 
The State presented little evidence which was not hearsay 
evidence in support of its termination petition. From the 
testimony of Ms. Haderlie (T. at 25-27) and Ms. Cruz (T. at 41 
-44) it is apparent that D.F.S. had only one intention with 
respect to the natural mother. To deny her all contact with her 
child. It is one thing to file a permanent deprivation petition 
based, in part, on a belief the continuing parent-child contact 
is adverse to the child, and then deny the contact based on a 
court order. It is quite another to form such a belief and then 
deny the parent contact because of that belief, without the 
benefit of a permanent deprivation petition or restraining order. 
In this case, the agency made certain that it would secure a 
finding of abandonment because the agency denied the mother 
contact until and after the permanent deprivation petition was 
filed. Whether this court chooses to rely on the abandonment 
statute, Section 78-3a-48(1)(b) U.C.A., or the Summers v. 
Wullfenstein, 560 P.2d 331 (Utah 1977), is immaterial. For, if 
"abandonment" occurred, it occurred as a result of the agency's 
conduct. 
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Because Ms. Cruz attempted to make contact with her child 
but was denied contact by D.F.S. the record does not support a 
finding of abandonment. 
POINT III 
The Findings And Order Terminating 
Mother's Parental Rights 
Are Not Supported By The Record 
The Findings and Order in this matter, which were drafted by 
the State, lack the support of the trial record. For instance, 
the lower court did not "judicially note" any prior 
adjudications. F. at 1. And, although there was hearsay evidence 
presented indicating that J.C. had been at Tiny Tots, there was 
no evidence presented that he was placed there "by his mother in 
1982, when he was two years old," or that the State "subsequently 
acquired custody and guardianship in 1984, on the basis of a 
dependency petition stipulated to by the mother." F. at 1. The 
majority of that which is material on page one of the Findings 
lacks the record's support. 
Likewise, the majority of the second page of the Findings is 
unsupported, due to a reliance on impermissible hearsay. The 
Findings, for instance, rely heavily on the child's alleged "bed-
wetting" and "flinching," none of which was introduced through 
competent, direct testimony., Here again there is mention of 
-8-
missed visits and lack of bonding. But no State witness even 
observed the alleged behavior and conduct. 
With respect to page three of the Findings, it is accurate 
that the court admitted two treatment plans as evidence. But, no 
competent evidence was presented that the natural mother "refused 
to comply" with them. 
In that the Findings and Order Terminating Mother's Parental 
Rights are unsupported by the record, the lower court decision 
should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, the natural mother 
respectfully requests that the Findings and Order terminating her 
parental rights in J.C. be reversed, and that this matter be 
remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. 
Submitted this 27th day of July, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM 
The natural mother's rights were terminated pursuant to 
Section 78-3a-48, U.C.A., which provides, in its pertinent part, 
that: 
(1) The court may decree a termination 
of all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if the court finds 
either (a), or (b) as follows: 
(a) that the parent or parents have 
abandoned the child. It is prima facie 
evidence of abandonment that the parent 
or parents, although having legal custody 
of the child, have surrendered physical 
custody of the child, and for a period 
of six months following the surrender 
have not manifested to the child or to 
the person having the physical custody 
of the child a firm intention to resume 
physical custody or to make arrangements 
for the care of the child; 
(b) has failed to communicate via mail, 
telephone, or otherwise for one year with 
the child or shown the normal interest 
of a natural parent, without just cause. 
DAVID E. YOOCM 
Salt lake County Attorney 
By: Frederic M. Oddone 
Deputy County Attorney 
3522 South 700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE CCUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS AND ORDER TERMINATING 
in the interest of: : MOTHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS 
CRUZ, Jesse (12-8-79) : Case No. 394707 
A person under eighteen years old. : Judge Olof A. Johansson 
The State's petition of Noventoer 15, 1989 to terminate the parental 
rights of Juanita Cruz to Jesse Cruz came on regularly for hearing before 
the Court on the 26th day of January, 1990, at the appointed hour. The 
mother was present and represented by Kim Rilling. Also present was Cathy 
Haderlie from the Division of Family Services and the maternal grandmother. 
Cathy Haderlie testified on behalf of the State and Juanita Cruz 
testified on her own behalf. The Court judicially noted the prior 
adjudications in legal file 394707. 
The Court determined that Jesse Cruz was born on December 8, 1979, 
to Juanita Cruz and Jesse Ruiz. The father has previously appeared before 
this Court and voluntarily relinquished his rights to Jesse. 
From the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the Court 
finds that Jesse is a mentally retarded child with impaired hearing, who 
was placed at Topham's Tiny Tots Care Center by his mother in 1982, when he 
was two years old and the State subsequently acquired custody and 
guardianship in 1984, on the basis of a dependency petition stipulated to 
by the mother. 
Jesse Cruz Page Two 
The Court finds that the mother had only limited visitation between 
1986 and 1987 and that as the result of the visitation, Jesse's emotional 
state deteriorated. Further, no significant bonding was observed by and 
between Jesse and Juanita during these visits. Between August 15, 1986 and 
November 7, 1986, although visits were offered by the State, Juanita 
refused to see Jesse. When visitation was resumed, his behavior continued 
to deteriorate and his bed-wetting and flinching at sudden movements or 
noises both increased, behaviors which the State noticed had nearly been 
eliminated while Jesse was in foster care. During 1987, Juanita only 
visited with Jesse on three occasions. Other visits were scheduled by the 
mother and or offered by the Division of Family Services, but were refused 
or cancelled by her. The Court finds that no other visits have occurred 
and there has been no contact between Juanita and her son since May 28, 
1987. Further, Juanita has failed to demonstrate a reasonable and normal 
concern for Jesse's welfare. Eetween 1987 and 1990, she failed to send 
Jesse any Christmas gifts or birthday presents or cards and other mementos 
for other festive days. Juanita moved during September of 1987, and 
refused to provide the State with her new address and subsequent to the 
move, failed to contact the Division of Family Services for apprimately 18 
months. 
Jesse Cruz Page Three 
The Court further found that this Court had ordered two treatment 
plans designed to reunite the mother with Jesse, which she refused to 
comply withe Juanita testified that she was aware of Jesse's irnpaired 
hearing and had developed signing skills in order to cxanmunicate with 
Jesse, but was unable to demonstrate to the Court any simple ccKiraunications 
which would be necessary for her to care for him properly. Juanita was 
unable to recall Jesse's date of birth and incapable of providing the Court 
with any suitable reason concerning failed visitation during the past two 
and one-half years. 
The Court found from the testimony of Cathy Haderlie that Jesse was 
currently in a foster care/adoptive hone with custodians who have worked 
with the mentally handicapped on a professional basis- Further, that the 
family wishes to adopt Jesse and have the skills, training and experience 
to work with Jesse. Jesse has resided in the hone for approximately nine 
months and his bed wetting has stepped and his behavior and speech have 
improved. 
From the foregoing, the Court finds that Juanita7s conduct tcwards 
Jesse is a substantial departure from that which is normal and has led to a 
breakdown of the child-parent relationship and that it is in Jesse's best 
interests to find that Juanita Cruz has abandoned her responsibilities for 
Jesse Cruz Page Four 
Jesse and her parental rights should be terminated. 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
1. Any and all parental rights of Juanita Cruz, in and to Jesse 
Cruz should be and hereby aire fully and caipletely severed, pursuant to 
78-3a-48, Utah Cede Annotated, as amended, including residual parental 
rights• 
2. Custody and guardianship of Jesse Cruz is continued with the 
Division of Family Services, who aire ordered to support and care for said 
minor. 
3. In the event that Jesse is adopted, a copy of the order of 
adoption should be filed herewith by the State of Utah. 
4. This matter is set for further review on the day 
of , 1990, at the hour of . 
Dated this day of . 
BY THE CCURT: 
ODDF A. JOHANSSON, Judge 
Third D i s t r i c t J u v e n i l e Court 
c c : Ann Wasserman 
Kim R i l l i n g . 
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